THE EU-JAPAN CONNECTIVITY PARTNERSHIP--ROADWAYS AND ROADBLOCKS.

• Author: Gaens, Bart

1. Introduction

   China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large-scale project based on foreign investment and infrastructure development in third countries launched in 2014, can be seen as a geo-economic means to create spheres of influence in Asia, Africa and Europe. In response to China, key actors have sought to balance against Beijing by proposing their own strategies to develop infrastructure in all its forms, both regionally and globally. As a result, connectivity has become a key driver of global power competition today. Of particular interest are the responses of two players who, explicitly or implicitly, see China as an economic competitor and systemic rival, namely the European Union and Japan. How do they aim to counter China in the sphere of connectivity? Importantly, does their view of cooperating with each other through a connectivity partnership stand any chance of success? Can the partnership deliver or does it punch vastly below its weight?

   As for methodology, this article applies the analytical framework devised by Gaens et al. (2023) to the connectivity endeavours by Japan and the EU. The framework allows for an assessment of connectivity projects in a comprehensive range of spheres, including material infrastructures, economic/financial transactions, institutional frameworks of governance, knowledge exchange, socio-cultural exchange and security. It furthermore provides the basis for an analysis of connectivity from the vantage points of cooperation, copying, cushioning (hedging), contestation, containment and coercion.

   The article starts off by defining connectivity, which has become a very trendy buzzword in international relations today, but often remains ill-defined. The same section also elaborates on the link between connectivity and geopolitics, including the possibilities for cooperation through the so-called infrastructure alliances, as well as for competition as key actors aim to establish contending spheres of interest through infrastructure development. The article thereafter elucidates the theoretical framework of analysis referred to above. Subsequently the article sketches the background of the EU-Japan bilateral relations as well as synergies, complementarities and shared interests that led to the creation of the connectivity partnership in 2019. The ensuing section surveys the EU-Japan partnership's progress on the ground, using the logics and spheres provided by the analytical framework as structuring tool. The article closes by outlining the limitations of the partnership, and pointing out some possible ways forward.

2. Connectivity and its conceptual and theoretical underpinnings

   2.1. Connectivity as a concept

   As argued by Pieterse (2021), connectivity is recent term, derived from the world of cyber technologies and social media. However, the notion in all its dimensions has been around for a very long time, and can even be regarded as the prerequisite of nearly all action, in view of the fact that social cooperation, networks and social capital are at the core of all human relations. Connectivity is strongly interlinked with both globalization and regional integration. Historically, the concept of connectivity has been instrumental to globalization, or the expansion of international cultural, economic, and political interaction and integration worldwide. 'Globalization' gained prominence in the 1990s as a result of the strong increase in international connectivity in the post-Cold-War world. While positive outcomes of this increased connectivity include global growth, increased productivity, new technologies, and more jobs, the term also acquired negative connotations, in the context of cultural homogenization, unfair working conditions, or environmental problems. Connectivity has also been at the core of regional integration. For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, connections and infrastructure development have been key tools for economic integration, while avoiding the strong political undertone of EU-style integration. (1) The adoption of the organization's Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity in 2010 was instrumental in launching the term connectivity within the field of diplomacy and international relations.

   After connectivity turned into a political buzzword, policy-making circles have aimed to define the concept. A useful but very comprehensive definition of connectivity originates from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), a multilateral forum for dialogue and cooperation between 51 states from Asia and Europe, and also including the European Union and the ASEAN Secretariat. Following preparatory work by the ASEM Pathfinder Group on Connectivity (APGC) starting in 2016, the 13th ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Myanmar in 2017 agreed on a definition of connectivity, stipulating that, in general, connectivity is about bringing countries, people and societies closer together. The concept includes 'hard' connectivity such as infrastructure projects, but also comprises 'soft' aspects (people-to-people, institutional and social-cultural linkages). It covers "all modes of transport (aviation, maritime, rail and road)" and also includes "institutions, infrastructure, financial cooperation, IT, digital links, energy, education and research, human resources development, tourism, cultural exchanges as well as customs, trade and investment facilitation". ASEM furthermore agreed that connectivity has to be in line with international standards and based on full transparency, and that sustainability needs to be a quality benchmark, including the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (ASEM Pathfinder Group on Connectivity 2017, Becker et al. 2019).

   Scholarly literature has subsequently attempted to further make sense of connectivity, as it presents itself in international relations today. Providing a concise definition, Ries (2019) has outlined the term as comprising "all the ways in which states, organisations (commercial or else) and societies are connected to each other and interact across the globe", including physical flows, information flows, infrastructures, regulatory measures and socio-cultural ties. Furthermore, building on ASEM's definition, Kacparek (2020) has argued that it is essential to take account of a threefold characteristic of connectivity: its strategic intent, its critical role as a modern foreign-policy tool, and its basis in investments in both physical (roads, digital cables and satellites) and non-physical infrastructure (cultural exchanges, research cooperation and customs facilitation).

   As one of the best-known scholars on, and proponents of, connectivity, Parag Khanna stands out. For Khanna (2018), connectivity is a mega-trend, a 'meta-pattern of our age', and a prime paradigm of global organisation, in which infrastructure is central as a key means to facilitate flows of people, commodities, goods, data, and capital. Connectivity is sine qua non for growth, social mobility, and economic resilience, and, in view of the global population growth and urbanization, an indispensable tool to create jobs and meet the gap between infrastructure supply and demand. Importantly, Khanna makes a distinction between geography and political borders. Rather than being rooted in legal and political spaces, the basis of the world's organization today lies in functional connections. Furthermore, connectivity is intrinsically geopolitical: trade routes, cross-border infrastructure, and supply chain mastery are deeply entangled with the 'high politics' of security, alliances, and arms control.

   2.2. Connectivity as theatre for cooperation and competition

   It is clear from the above that connectivity in all its dimensions offers, first of all, possibilities for cooperation. Khanna has argued that the era of 'infrastructure alliances' marked by connectivity and flows has started, and China has taken on a leading role in building these geo-economic partnerships with third countries. Beijing is successfully accessing raw materials in third countries to feed its export-oriented industry, and uses infrastructure development and supply chain mastery as drivers of geopolitical status and influence (Khanna 2016a). Following China's example, other actors have increasingly tried to establish functional partnerships and engage in connective endeavors as a means to obtain mutual benefits at the bilateral, region-to-region and multi-stakeholder levels. In recent years several collaborative plans have been devised by major players within Asia-Europe relations and in the Indo-Pacific. In 2017 at the African Development Bank (AfDB) meeting, Japan and India announced a partnership agreement, labeled the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), focusing on economy, technology and infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific and Africa. The US and Japan also launched the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP) focused on energy sector reform. Furthermore, in 2022 the G7 Summit relaunched the Build Back Better World (B3W) plan as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), pledging USD 600 billion to infrastructure projects over the next five years. Other recent cooperative endeavors include the Japan-U.S. Clean Energy Partnership (JUCEP) to support decarbonization efforts in the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S.-Japan Global Digital Connectivity Partnership (GDCP) to promote international rules of dataflow. Finally, the US, Japan and Australia launched the Blue Dot Network (BDN) in 2019 in order to devise a certification mechanism to promote quality infrastructure investment that complies with inclusivity, transparency and environmental and sustainability standards. (2)

   Connectivity partnerships are increasingly becoming part of the EU's toolbox. As noted most recently by the Council of the EU, Connectivity Partnerships with other countries and regions such as Japan, India, ASEAN and the US, can "promote...