RETHINKING SOCIAL PROTEST MOVEMENTS' THEORIZATION: LESSONS FROM EGYPT, BURKINA FASO AND BOLIVIA.

• Author: Hitman, Gadi

1. Introduction

   Normally, the main duties of the security forces (police, army, presidential guard) are to defend the state and its citizens from internal or external threats, authorized to use deadly force and weapons, in order to support the interests of the state and some or all of its citizens. The army, for instance, is usually perceived as the defensive shield of the ruler, if not the ruler itself (Perlmutter 1977). Looking back in history. Lenin was quoted saying: "no revolution of the masses can triumph without the help of a portion of the armed forces that sustained the regime" (as cited by Russellm 2013:3).

   Historically, when the political situation in different countries often became unstable, the army, as well as internal security forces, took a clear position: standing by the incumbent regime or leading a coup d'etat in order to maintain stability, sometimes by staying in power for decades. In most cases, the army stands behind the ruler and does not allow internal turmoil for long. Turkey, Chile, Argentine and Pakistan are examples from the second half of the 20th century.

   However, examples from Egypt, Burkina Faso and Bolivia, especially between the years 2011-2015, examined hereinafter, suggest that official security forces also fulfil a social anti-regime role, being a part of a wide popular protest and even tipping its scale:

   1. The Bolivian case study: an inherent involvement of the national police in social protests against the regime (1952, 1990s, 2003, 2007, 2014), mostly due to salary deprivation, based on social status. In addition, both in 1952 and in 2014, there is evidence of military involvement in popular protest, contrary to the army's usual loyalty to the president. In the most recent case, soldiers initiated the upheaval, but the mobilization converted into a vast social protest movement with broad-based support.

   2. The Egyptian case study: In January 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces had motivated Tahrir Square protest against President Husni Mubarak, when it declared its unwillingness to combat the protesters. In June 2013, the Egyptian Armed Forces followed millions of Egyptians' demand to remove elected the Muslim Brothers' rule, and ousted President Muhammad Mursi.

   3. The Burkinabe case study: In 2011 military mutinies followed widespread civilian protests, indicating a crisis of confidence in President Compaore. Putting this revolt into a historic context shows a pattern of interconnectedness between military revolts and civilian demonstrations in the country. Accordingly, in 2014, the Burkinabe Armed Forces had joined, declaratively and passively, the renewed civil protest against Compaore forcing him to step down.

   Our hypothesis is that in all case studies, armies and other state-owned bodies, such as the police, meet the criteria of social protest movements. In each case, a security force is a central social player, with a profound capacity to influence protest and bring about political change. Therefore, a social protest movement's definition should not be restricted to actors who have (or do not have) a legal-institutional position. A social protest movement should be analysed upon an actor's activity patterns. This kind of perception allows a wider definition of protest movements and a better understanding of the phenomenon.

   The first part of the paper will review relevant theoretical literature on collective protest as previous studies have already analyzed. The second part will present the experience of security apparatuses' involvement in protest against the regime in Bolivia Egypt and Burkina Faso, examining whether the army/police/other governmental institution was fully in support of the regime nor did it engage in protest. In the last part, we will draw conclusions from all three cases regarding the theorizing of social protest movements at large.

   Methodologically, this study is a qualitative one. It based on previous studies and media reports. The research literature focuses on the political history of the country and the protests that existed in the past. These studies did not deal on the subject in question as this study discusses it. The media reports used in this study deal with the protests that have occurred in each of the three countries in recent years (Egypt 2011, Bolivia 2014, Burkina Faso 2011, 2014).

2. Social protest movement--definitions and criteria

   Through the years, scholars have tried to define social protest movement, focusing on different aspects. First, some of them had stressed the development process of the movement. Secondly, others focused on external circumstances that use as a relevant platform for emergence of this kind of movements (Blumer 1951: 166-222, Delia Porta and Diani 2009, Eyerman and Jamison 1998, Tarrow 1982). Thirdly, scholars pay attention to the crystallization process of shared identity among a group's members, and Forth, they regard to the idea that the movement strives to promote. But even with these differences, most of them agree that social movements are informal networks, based on solidarity and beliefs that are in political confrontation with the regime, aspiring to change the socio-political status quo.

   For the purpose of this study, I use a combination of Diani's definition for social movements and Fligstein and McAdam's theory of strategic action field. Diani defined it as: "networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, based on shared collective identities" (Diani 1992:4). This classical definition can be relevant for analysing social movements asking to protest in order to change social, cultural or political situation. However, this definition lacks any linkage to protest within the formal establishment. Almost twenty years later, they offer 'strategic action fields' (SAF hereinafter), which are the fundamental units of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field's rules (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 3). In the case studies of this paper, the SAF was decided by informal protesters and well-established participants--security forces--or government units personal as SAF's theory defines them.

   There are different approaches to the criteria of socio-political protest: First, collective behaviour theory, which is defined as the behaviour of aggregates whose interaction is "affected by some sense that they constitute a group" (Turner and Killian, 1965, 1957: 4). This approach meets Diani's definition and believes that a social movement is acting outside the establishment and looking to change the current situation--politically and many times culturally. This attitude has also sought for cohesiveness among its members around the goals.

   Neil Smelser's model contains six independent variables for explaining collective behaviour, as it starts with structural conduciveness and ends with mechanism of social control, i.e. whether the authorities allow the people to protest or do they have the will and the power to stop it, even by force (Smelser 1965). His model can explain what, why, when and how people coalesce, but it suffers a major lacuna. It does not take into consideration the possibility that protest can emerge from within the public-political establishment, usually supported by opposition forces, as happened in fact in more than one state.

   Second, resource mobilization theory, which focuses on conditions that may urge social movements to act (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217). This theory stresses that the odds to change reality increase, if there is an identified and agreed upon leadership inside the movement, and this leadership has previous political experience. This theory discerns between five different types of resources: material, moral, organizational, human and cultural (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Material resources mean time, money and people who need to act for achieving goals. Moral resources refer to identification with the ends which are connected to moral and normative values in society. Organizational resources refer to the maximum extraction of the resources. What is important here is the strategic effort and coordination between the members of the movement to utilize the collective abilities. The joint activity around shared purpose must be carried out with full coordination (Pagnucco 1996: 11). Finally, resource mobilization theory asserts that the strategic targets of a social protest movement are changing the regime's policy and recruiting public support. The way to achieve that is by demonstrations, signing on petitions and sometimes even through violent action.

   Third, the theory of collective identity. This approach emerged out of criticism against scholars who emphasized resources as necessary for social protest movements. Collective identity theory stresses that socio-psychological aspects and beliefs are the key to convince people to participate in protests or a violent action (Whittier 1995). It can be achieved through shared beliefs, symbols or language that bring people to cooperate when political situation allows it (Melluci 1989: 34). Identity is a combination of emotional, moral and cognitive contexts that an individual has with certain group, community or movement (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 284). Eventually, it does not matter whether these contexts are real or imagined. The group's identity is expressed by shared values, a common language and customs, agreement upon cultural symbols and signs, ceremonies and even identical dress style. When this collective identity is solid enough, members of the group may consider protest activity against the incumbent regime, especially if they express...