CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY AND THE UYGHUR CRACKDOWN: THE APPEARANCE OF CONSISTENCY AND THE REALITY OF CONTRADICTION. CHINA'S DOUBLE STANDARDS IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

• Author: Rahman, Sadia

1. Introduction

   It is not uncommon for states to pursue two incompatible approaches to human rights in domestic and international affairs. When it comes to human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing, gender issues, and child abuse, states take a different posture in front of the world than when dealing with such concerns internally (McQuigg 2011). Domestic human rights abuse generates international criticism, however, an overall approach undertaken by the criticized state is that it is a matter of state sovereignty. Such a stance rekindles the debate on the interdependent, interrelated and indivisibility of international human rights regime and state sovereignty (Donnelly and Whelan 2020).

   Powerful states prefer to interpret international human rights norms according to their own national interest, so do less powerful states, such as Myanmar, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Uganda. This article focuses on the People's Republic of China's (PRC) international stance on human rights and its human rights abuse in Xinjiang to emphasize the shift the international community is enduring with the increase of China's stature as a significant global player. Its interpretation or attempt of alteration of international human rights will have an inclusive influence unlike the less powerful states (Fung 2019). The states' double-standard diplomacy is a common occurrence, but China's double-standard practices in the area of international human rights are particularly significant because its remarkable economic growth has greatly bolstered its diplomatic clout, allowing it to rise to prominence in world affairs (Shambaugh 2020). In other words, it can besides be pondered that China's every activity at the international institutions is being noted worldwide and easy to receive criticism unlike the Western states because China has located its footing at the United Nations (UN) human rights bodies.

   Ample literature in light of states' behaviour on human rights violations and states implementing universal human rights norms subsist (Donnelly 2003; Burton 2013) including the contestation of state sovereignty and human rights regime (Delbruck 1982). However, little has been written about what happens if China succeeds in changing the human rights system. Because China adheres to the older version of state sovereignty rather than the modern, which is subjected to limitations (Carrai 2019), this boils down to postulating a central question-what would be the impact of China's double-standard diplomacy in the international human rights regime?

   In an attempt to decipher China's trajectory of alteration we treat the international human rights regime as a dependent variable. The anticipated conclusion is that China through alteration is preparing the conduit to favour itself and other autocratic states. Consistent with China's bifurcated version of human rights, our analytical analysis takes two approaches. First, China's stance on international human rights diplomacy; second, the human rights abuse of the Uyghurs by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exposes China's inconsistency. Given its track record on domestic human rights issues, such as stifling freedom of expression and cracking down on domestic human rights activists, there is justification for changing the international human rights regime to deflect/silence global criticism of and/or action on its own human rights violations (Burnay 2020).

   Thus, the phrase, China is a rising power should be revised as it has already augmented in power. Its rise puts the framework of international relations and the values of many global institutions in jeopardy (Forsythe 2000). With Xi Jinping's ascension to power the watershed moment emerged for domestic and global governance, one of the prime targets being international human rights institutions (Piccone 2018). Like other powers (established powers like Russia and emerging powers and a swing state like India) that have challenged global institutions' universal ideals, any rising or risen power would also resort to doing when it is on the path of expansionism. China is following suit (Gotz and Merien 2018, Kliman 2012). This veracity of China challenging international institutions' norms is complemented from the third world states' perspective because China enjoys an appeal to thirdworld states (or developing nations), while the crucial P2 nexus (China and Russia) reigns supreme and exerts influence over human rights procedures. Whether the P2 nexus does pose an unprecedented challenge in modifying the international human rights regime or whether China can independently make a difference will also be underscored in the article.

2. The puzzle

   Although human rights have a long history, the modern concept arose from the trauma of World War II (1) . The international bill is based on three core instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 and its two binding covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966 (2) . States like China, which postulate the notion of cultural relativism to gain international support, have utilized the modern concept of transpiration from western philosophy and politics as a subject of disagreement (Burke 2013). Experts such as Falk (1981), Donnelly (1998), and Hagan and Levi (2007) and Rachel George (2020) have described remorseful affairs regarding the enforcement of international conventions that protect human rights in all spheres of social and political life because of state sovereignty. Although state sovereignty is a complicated concept, it is the most important legal and political component of the international order. As members of international society, states participate in international relations based on the idea of sovereign equality. As a result, the attribute of sovereignty encapsulates the state's superiority in carrying out the governors' will (Bartelson 2006). This is not to say that governments can abuse their power. Under international law, states have duties and responsibilities that limit the possibility of power abuse (Ginsburg 2020). Because human rights are the cornerstone of domestic law, all states, particularly authoritarian states, violate human rights implying that state sovereignty and human rights are inherently at odds. In light of that states continue to ratify treaties because international human rights treaties provide legitimacy prompting the degree to which states are socialized in international society affecting their decisions to ratify, even if at the cost of some sovereign independence (Wotipka and Tsutsui's 2008: 724-726).

   An analogous perspective on sovereignty that has spawned so much complication is that sovereignty has undergone emendation and no longer entails absolute authority. As the international system has deemed necessary, the modern concept of sovereignty is relative and susceptible to restrictions (Delbruck 1982). The UN Charter does recognize the sovereign equality of member states. Hitherto in chapter VII it is also mentioned that the organization can interfere in sovereign states' policies if it is threatening international peace and security (3) . This paradoxical relationship of state sovereignty is not only limited to the legal and moral concept, but also extends further between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Consequently, the difficulty the international community has had in reconciling forms of humanitarian intervention, including the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (2005), with practices of state sovereignty became apparent after Western intervention in Libya (2011) and subsequent vetoes by Russia and China humanitarian intervention in Syria (Donnelly 2003).

   In China, the concept of sovereignty is the vital shield that is used under the semblance of counter-terrorism to buttress its activities in re-education camps in Xinjiang (4) . This is conceivable because the international counter-terrorism law provides a vague definition of terrorism which stands in infringement of the guidelines prepared by the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (5) . States, mostly authoritarian states within the international human rights circle have kept the debate between universalism and relativism alive and controversial, rendering them unreconcilable. Their pushing of cultural relativism refuting human rights law exemplifies universal ideals and rights is (mis)use of relativism vis-a-vis human rights remarking that the ethical systems develop in the context of local cultures and universal application of it should not be assumed (Good 2010). Fernando R. Teson's evaluated elaborately different facets of cultural relativism, i.e. strong and weak, concluding that cultural relativism is not the right approach to address human rights concerns (Teson 1985). In contemporary context the international human rights law may be imperfect, but it symbolizes the inspired response for the international community. And, insistent on adopting the entirety of relativist argument dismisses the prospects of objectivity a blockade to observe beyond one's own culture bound reality (Kanarek 2013).

   Ironically, to marginalize the universality of universal human rights norms, cultural relativist endorses that there exist no universal laws, norms, or principles but actively promote being tolerant towards different cultures underpinning tolerance as a de facto truth. Although recognizing the universal character of human rights in the 1993 international Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (6) , the states support the cultural relativist argument because of the political benefits it provides to powerful elites. Nevertheless, misuse of it could result in individuals and minority groups being unprotected from the government (Zechenter 1997). Theoretical arguments by Jack Donnelly on relative universality...